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Do Farmers Adopt Fewer Conservation Practices on Rented Land? Evidence from Straw 1 
Retention in China 2 
Abstract 3 
We examine how land tenure arrangements affect Chinese crop farmers’ adoption of straw 4 
retention, a key conservation practice promoted by the Chinese government in part to curb rising 5 
air pollution. Using data from a 2016 farmer household survey covering 1,659 crop plots in 6 
Henan Province in central China, we analyze whether farmers are less likely to adopt straw 7 
retention on rented plots compared to own-contracted plots. To address the potential endogeneity 8 
of the choice of renting from others, we use an instrument exploiting the role of remittance 9 
income from household members migrated to cities in a bivariate probit model and a control 10 
function approach, respectively. Our main results reveal that the Chinese crop farmers’ 11 
likelihood of adopting straw retention were almost cut in half on rented plots compared to their 12 
owned plots, assuming the assumptions for biprobit or control functions hold. This suggests 13 
greater attention is needed to examine the spillovers across agricultural and environmental 14 
policies as China pushes for both a nationwide land rental market and more sustainable 15 
agricultural practices. 16 
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1. Introduction 21 
Land tenure security is crucial in promoting the adoption of various conservation practices, 22 
including conservation tillage (Lee and Stewart, 1983; Soule et al., 2000), contour farming 23 
(Soule et al., 2000), conservation crops (Fraser, 2004), and stone terraces or soil bunds 24 
(Gebremedhin and Swinton, 2003). Arguably, more secure land tenure, which often refers to 25 
complete, permanent, or durable ownership of farmland, leads to higher willingness to adopt 26 
conservation practices, especially those practices with long-term soil fertility benefits. This is 27 
likely because greater land tenure security increases the likelihood of farmers reaping the 28 
benefits of land investments, which are often long-term (Feder et al., 1988; Soule et al., 2000; 29 
Fraser, 2004; Kabubo-Mariara et al., 2010). Despite the perceived significance of land tenure, 30 
there is a lack of evidence of the role of land tenure security in conservation practice adoptions, 31 
especially in developing countries such as China. This, in part, results from varying definitions of 32 
land tenure security and heterogeneity in the ownership and tenure systems across different 33 
countries (Kabubo-Mariara et al., 2010). 34 
In China, land tenure security has particular relevance because, under the current Household 35 
Responsibility System (HRS), agricultural land is owned by the collectives at the village level, 36 
and each eligible farmer household is granted a land contract right to farm a village-allocated 37 
land parcel with up to 30 years of tenure (Hu, 1997). The distinct nature of rural tenure systems 38 
confronts Chinese farmers with greater land tenure insecurity, which could potentially hinder 39 
farmers’ investments in production and conservation practices, especially those with a long time 40 
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horizon. For instance, researchers have found that frequent land reallocation by the village 41 
collectives to accommodate a growing rural population often dampens the stability and security 42 
of land tenure, resulting in a very uncertain land tenure length with an effective length of much 43 
less than 30 years (Liu et al., 1998; Brandt et al., 2002; Tan et al., 2006). 44 
In fact, since Jacoby et al. (2002), many researchers have examined the impacts of land 45 
tenure insecurity in Chinese farmers’ production decisions, with a focus on input use such as 46 
organic fertilizer (e.g., Jacoby et al., 2002), land use efficiency (Zhang et al., 2011; Leight, 47 
2016), and forest output efficiency (Salant and Yu, 2016). In contrast, evidence of the impacts of 48 
land tenure in conservation practice adoption in China is relatively scarce. Wang et al. (2010) 49 
investigate the determinants of adopting conservation tillage as well as residue retention; 50 
however, they do not consider land tenure as a driving factor. Liu and Huang (2013) were among 51 
the first to assess how land tenure security affects conservation practice adoption and show that 52 
the ownership of land is slightly positively associated with increased likelihood of using contour 53 
cultivation.1 54 
However, to the best of our knowledge, no study has explicitly modeled the role of land 55 
tenure in the adoption of straw retention, an increasingly important component of conservation 56 
practices (Pittelkow et al., 2015). Straw retention (i.e., returning straw to the field) refers to a 57 
residue management strategy of covering the crop straws on the soil surface after harvest, which 58 
has been proven to improve long-term soil productivity (Lu, 2015; Wang et al., 2015), and boost 59 
                                                             
1 Chinese farmers do not own the farmland. As will be discussed in detail later, the “ownership” of a plot by a farmer household 
in China is actually represented as the land contract right. 
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yield (Huang et al., 2013; Wang et al., 2015). However, burning straw, which generates large 60 
amounts of PM 2.5 (Tao et al., 2013; Shon, 2015; Chen et al., 2017), is still common in China 61 
and has become one of its biggest environmental problems despite increased public attention, 62 
fines, and penalties. In an attempt to reduce open burning of straw, thus curbing PM 2.5 63 
pollution, the Chinese government has recently undertaken various measures supporting 64 
sustainable utilization of crop residues. For instance, in May 2015, the government announced a 65 
straw retention subsidy pilot project, which offered a cash payment to farmers to encourage straw 66 
retention adoption. The project was extended to all of China in 2016.2 In addition, we analyze 67 
land tenure insecurity in the context of new policies in which China increasingly promotes rural 68 
land transfers among farmers through a land rental market. There is a lack of understanding on 69 
whether and how farmers make production and conservation decisions differently on rented land 70 
obtained through the rental market versus their own-contracted farmland allocated by collectives. 71 
This study aims to examine whether and how land rental decisions, which are increasingly 72 
prevalent under the new rural land transfer market, affect Chinese crop farmers’ adoption of 73 
straw retention. We hypothesize that Chinese crop farmers are less likely to adopt straw retention 74 
and other conservation practices on land rented from others due to their perceived less secure 75 
land tenure arrangement. We argue that farmers on rented fields face less secure land tenure due 76 
to the short-term nature of leasing contracts, and thus have lower willingness to undertake a 77 
                                                             
2 The pilot project in 2015 was undertaken in five provinces—Anhui, Shandong, Hunan, Sichuan and Zhejiang. Our study 
analyzes crop and crop residue choices by farmers in Henan province for the 2015 growing season, which was not included in the 
pilot project. In addition, the progress on the subsidy project varied dramatically among different regions. Based on the 
experiences of our interviewers, most farmer households in Henan were not aware of this subsidy program at the time of the 
survey. 
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conservation practice compared to land formally allocated to them via long-term contracts from 78 
the collectives. 79 
To test our hypothesis, we use a 2016 rural household survey covering 1,659 crop plots in 80 
Henan Province in central China and analyze whether farmers are less likely to adopt straw 81 
retention on rented plots compared to own-contracted plots. To address the potential endogeneity 82 
of the land tenure variable, we rely on an instrument that proxies the remittance income from the 83 
household members who migrated into cities. Arguably, a higher ratio of migrants’ income over 84 
agricultural profits, conditional on available laborers and farmers’ household income, would lead 85 
to a smaller likelihood of renting from others but not directly shift conservation practice choices. 86 
Following Wooldridge (2010), we employ both a bivariate probit and a control function approach 87 
using the above instrument to address the endogenous explanatory variable of land tenure. 88 
Our main results confirmed that Chinese crop farmers are less likely to adopt straw 89 
retention on fields rented from others compared to own-contracted plots. In particular, the 90 
bivariate probit and control functions controlling for the endogeneity of the land tenure variable 91 
suggest that on average, the likelihood of Chinese crop farmers adopting straw retention on 92 
rented fields are almost only half compared to that for their own-contracted fields. In contrast, 93 
simple probit regressions with endogenous land tenure variable show that a rented plot is 94 
associated with an eight percent reduction in the probability of adopting straw retention after 95 
harvest throughout 2015. Overall, our results confirm our hypothesis of less conservation 96 
practice adoption given less secure land tenure arrangements, and are comparable to many 97 
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studies in other countries. 98 
This study contributes to the literature of conservation practice adoption by quantitatively 99 
examining the link between land tenure security and straw retention adoption in China for the 100 
first time. In particular, our analysis provides evidence that Chinese crop farmers are 101 
significantly less likely to adopt straw retention, a critical conservation practice, on rented plots 102 
compared to those own-contracted plots. More importantly, our research is of great policy 103 
relevance since it reveals the previously overlooked, potentially negative interconnection 104 
between two policies promoted by the Chinese government—encouraging the adoption of straw 105 
retention and expanding the rural land rental market—and offers insights into how the 106 
government can better promote and balance them. Finally, the significant larger average partial 107 
effect in the main specifications suggests that one needs to control for the endogeneity of the 108 
land tenure variable using the biprobit or control function approach. 109 
The rest of this article is organized as follows: Section 2 provides a brief review of China’s 110 
land system and the development of the land rental market. Section 3 introduces the conceptual 111 
framework. Section 4 introduces the empirical implementation strategy. Section 5 describes the 112 
data used in this study and empirical implementation. Section 6 discusses the empirical results. 113 
Section 7 provides concluding remarks. 114 
2. Land Tenure and Land Rental Market in China 115 
China prohibits private land ownership. The current HRS was introduced in the early 1980s and 116 
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allocates a parcel of contracted farmland to each eligible rural household on the basis of 117 
household size, which is referred to as the land contract (and use) right. Nevertheless, the 118 
allocated land is owned by village collectives represented by villager committee or township 119 
government (Hu, 1997). Farmers are free to make their own agricultural production decisions, 120 
though they are not permitted to convert the land to non-agricultural use. In the early stages of 121 
HRS, land contracts only lasted for a one- or two-year period, which led to significant land 122 
tenure insecurity and discouraged farmers from making land improvements (Krusekopf, 2002). 123 
Realizing this limitation, the Chinese government lengthened the land contract terms to 15 years, 124 
further extending it to 30 years in 1993 (Zhang et al., 2011). 125 
However, the increase in duration of land contracts did not necessarily improve the tenure 126 
security for rural households for two reasons: (a) village collectives periodically reallocate 127 
village land through administrative means to reach egalitarian goals in response to household 128 
demographic changes, even in the midst of land contract periods (Liu et al., 1998; Brandt et al., 129 
2002; Tan et al., 2006); and, (b) collective allocations efficiency is negatively impacted by an 130 
increasing number of rural migrants going off-farm and working outside the village, which tends 131 
to lead to productive inefficiency (Benjamin and Brandt, 2002). 132 
In response to the rising need of more secure land tenure, the central government has 133 
codified a framework for the protection of land rights and development of a land rental market, 134 
including the Land Management Law (1998), the Rural Land Contracting Law (2003), and the 135 
Property Law (2007). Subsequently, the land rental market took off rapidly, with a participation 136 
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rate of about 10 percent in 2001 (Deininger and Jin, 2005), and stayed around that level for 137 
almost a decade. However, in many areas, farmland continued to be illegally reallocated by local 138 
officials (Zhang et al., 2011). With the steady increase in the number of rural workers migrating 139 
to urban regions, more and more rural households no longer have the need to keep all contracted 140 
land due to lack of laborers, which to a large extent stimulates the development of a rural rental 141 
market. Figure 1 shows the national growth of transferred rural land in China. The percentage of 142 
transferred land over the total contracted land to rural households has tripled from less than 10 143 
percent in 2008 to about 33 percent in 2015. 144 
 145 
 146 
Figure 1. Scale of land Transfers in China, 2008–2015. 147 
(Source: Author’s calculation; Ye, 2015; Ministry of Agriculture, 2014, 2015, 2016) 148 
 149 
More recently, the Chinese government has formally announced the intent to protect and 150 
split rural land rights into three parts: ownership, contract, and use. Ensuring permanent 151 
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collective land ownership, the government allows rural households to lease out the land use right 152 
while maintaining the original land contract with the village government, which is largely to 153 
stimulate land transfer through the rental market.3 However, the decomposition of rural land 154 
rights may raise a further question. The transferred land use right, which depends on how the 155 
leasing contract is made between rural households, may not be as secure as the land contract 156 
right. 157 
While rural land transfer allows more flexible allocation of farmland across farmers, 158 
potentially moving from inefficient producers to more efficient producers, it remains uncertain 159 
how the tenants, who obtained the farmland via the rural land transfer market for a finite amount 160 
of time, would treat these land parcels differently compared to those owned and operated by its 161 
original contractees. Enlightened by previous literature on limited investments on rented land 162 
(Soule et al., 2000; Fraser, 2004; Kabubo-Mariara et al., 2010), we assume that tenants of rented 163 
land would have less incentive to make long-term investments, such as adopting conservation 164 
practices (i.e., straw retention) on these parcels. 165 
3. Conceptual Framework 166 
Following previous works by McConnell (1983) and Soule et al. (2000), we develop a 167 
three-stage model to analyze the adoption behavior of straw retention under different land tenure 168 
arrangements. 169 
                                                             
3 See the 2014 No. 1 Policy Document available at http://www.moa.gov.cn/zwllm/zwdt/201401/t20140120_3742582.htm (in 
Chinese). 
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In the first stage, after the crop is harvested for the current growing season, the farmer 170 
household decides on the treatment of crop residues (straws), which involves a treatment cost 171 
denoted by 𝐶𝐶𝑗𝑗. In this context, we designate 𝑗𝑗 = 𝑠𝑠 for adopting straw retention and 𝑗𝑗 = 𝑛𝑛 for 172 
non-adoption. Straw retention requires straws to be smashed before they are covered and mixed 173 
with the soil surface, which takes additional machinery or labor costs and thus 𝐶𝐶𝑠𝑠 > 0. If straws 174 
are not returned to the fields, farmers can either burn, discard, or use straws for other off-farm 175 
purposes such as feed, fuel, and to sell. Any of these treatments may also involve some costs 176 
including collecting, storing, and transporting of straws and thus 𝐶𝐶𝑛𝑛 > 0. It is difficult to 177 
determine which of 𝐶𝐶𝑠𝑠 and 𝐶𝐶𝑛𝑛 is higher, as 𝐶𝐶𝑗𝑗 depends on specific straw treatment as well as 178 
the crop type. 179 
Straw treatment in the first stage will also affect farming for the next season. Let 𝜋𝜋𝑗𝑗 be the 180 
second-season net returns under first-stage straw treatment, 𝑗𝑗. Although straws can improve soil 181 
quality, acting similar to fertilizer, it takes time for straw to decay, which may affect the next 182 
cropping given that farmers are often time-pressed between harvesting and sowing (Peng et al., 183 
2016; Zhang et al., 2017), especially during autumn and in double-crop rotation areas like Henan 184 
Province. During the process of decaying, it may also lead to insect damage, which potentially 185 
increases the cost of pesticide use and hurts crop yields (Cai et al., 2011; Dinardo-Miranda and 186 
Fracasso, 2013; Carvalho et al., 2017). Therefore, there are many ways that straw retention may 187 
affect short-term profits, as a result it is common that 𝜋𝜋𝑠𝑠 < 𝜋𝜋𝑛𝑛. 188 
For the final stage, the farmer household is concerned with the terminal value of its 189 
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farmland, denoted by 𝑉𝑉𝑗𝑗. Research has shown that straw retention can help reduce soil erosion 190 
and improve fertility and productivity over time, thus better retaining the long-term value of the 191 
land. Therefore, 𝑉𝑉𝑠𝑠 > 𝑉𝑉𝑛𝑛. 192 
Assume that a farmer household (either contractee or renter) selects a straw treatment 193 
option, 𝑗𝑗, to maximize the present value, 𝑃𝑃𝑉𝑉𝑗𝑗, of the three terms previously discussed on a 194 
cultivated plot (either own-contracted or rented), as shown by the following equation: 195 
 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚
(𝑗𝑗)
𝑃𝑃𝑉𝑉𝑗𝑗 = 𝜋𝜋𝑗𝑗 − 𝐶𝐶𝑗𝑗 + 𝜆𝜆 𝑉𝑉𝑗𝑗 (1 + 𝑟𝑟)𝑇𝑇⁄ , (1) 196 
where 𝑟𝑟 represents the discount rate and 𝑇𝑇 the number of periods. Following Soule et al. 197 
(2000), 𝜆𝜆 is included as a tenure-security indicator weighting the third term that measures the 198 
farmer household’s belief about its ability to use or sell the land in the future. Therefore, the 199 
more secure the land tenure, the higher 𝜆𝜆 and greater importance of the long-term land value in 200 
the household’s decision-making process. 201 
Based on equation (1), it is optimal for a rational farmer household to adopt straw retention 202 
when 203 
 𝜋𝜋𝑠𝑠 − 𝐶𝐶𝑠𝑠 + 𝜆𝜆 𝑉𝑉𝑠𝑠 (1 + 𝑟𝑟)𝑇𝑇⁄ > 𝜋𝜋𝑛𝑛 − 𝐶𝐶𝑛𝑛 + 𝜆𝜆 𝑉𝑉𝑛𝑛 (1 + 𝑟𝑟)𝑇𝑇⁄  (2) 204 
or 205 
 𝜆𝜆 𝛥𝛥𝑉𝑉 𝑅𝑅⁄ > 𝛥𝛥𝛥𝛥, (3) 206 
where 𝛥𝛥𝛥𝛥 = (𝜋𝜋𝑛𝑛 − 𝐶𝐶𝑛𝑛) − (𝜋𝜋𝑠𝑠 − 𝐶𝐶𝑠𝑠), 𝛥𝛥𝑉𝑉 = 𝑉𝑉𝑠𝑠 − 𝑉𝑉𝑛𝑛  and 𝑅𝑅 = (1 + 𝑟𝑟)𝑇𝑇 . Since 𝑉𝑉𝑠𝑠 > 𝑉𝑉𝑛𝑛  and 𝑅𝑅 207 
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is positive, condition (3) actually suggests that the adoption of straw retention hinges on whether 208 
the potential short-term profit loss (i.e., the right-hand side) can be offset by the perceived gains 209 
in long-term land value (i.e., the left-hand side). That is, with higher 𝜆𝜆, or more secure land 210 
tenure, the farmer household is more likely to undertake long-term improvement activities such 211 
as straw retention, as stated in our hypothesis. 212 
An empirical estimate of the value of 𝜆𝜆 is lacking. In countries where private land 213 
ownership is well-established, it is plausible to assume that 𝜆𝜆 = 1 for a land owner. While in the 214 
context of China, the corresponding “owner” of farmland may be the contractee who bears both 215 
the land contract and use rights. The value of 𝜆𝜆𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑛𝑛𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐 is possibly lower than, but close to 1, 216 
since land contractees are also confronted with tenure insecurity such as land reallocation. For 217 
renters, 𝜆𝜆 should be much lower since they only possess the land use right and are mainly 218 
concerned with short-term profits. However, 𝜆𝜆𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑛𝑛𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐 could be higher than zero if renters can 219 
continually use the land, which depends on the duration of the lease. In this case, more than 90 220 
percent of the existing leases in the study region are oral and informal on a one-year basis. Thus, 221 
we hypothesize that 𝜆𝜆𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑛𝑛𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐 < 𝜆𝜆𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑛𝑛𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐  or the probability of adopting straw retention is 222 
higher for contractees than for renters, which we test in our empirical model. 223 
4. Empirical Implementation 224 
4.1. Base probit model 225 
To test the above hypothesis, we first employ a binary discrete choice model derived from the 226 
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latent variable approach. Let 𝑦𝑦 denote a farmer household’s decision to adopt straw retention or 227 
not, which is generated from a latent variable, 𝑦𝑦∗, equal to 𝜆𝜆 𝛥𝛥𝑉𝑉 𝑅𝑅⁄ − 𝛥𝛥𝛥𝛥 from equation (3). 228 
The difference between short-term profits and long-term land values for the farmer household is 229 
unobserved, but one can observe the household’s adoption decision. If 𝑦𝑦∗ is positive, straw 230 
retention is adopted and 𝑦𝑦 = 1 is observed; otherwise, 𝑦𝑦 = 0 is observed if 𝑦𝑦∗ is negative. 231 
For each household, 𝑖𝑖, the latent variable 𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖∗ is assumed to be a linear function of the 232 
vector of observable household, plot, and regional characteristics (𝐗𝐗𝑖𝑖) as follows: 233 
 𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖∗ = 𝛃𝛃𝐗𝐗𝑖𝑖 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖, (4) 234 
where 𝛃𝛃 is the coefficient vector and 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖 a random error term. The linkage between 𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖∗ and 𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖 235 
is as follows: 236 
 𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖 = �
1, 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖∗ > 0
0, 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖∗ < 0
, (5) 237 
then the probability that household 𝑖𝑖 adopts straw retention (𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖 = 1) is given by 238 
 𝑃𝑃𝑟𝑟[𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖 = 1] = 𝑃𝑃𝑟𝑟[𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖∗ > 0] (6) 239 
= 𝑃𝑃𝑟𝑟[𝛃𝛃𝐗𝐗𝑖𝑖 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖 > 0] 240 
= 1 − 𝑃𝑃𝑟𝑟[𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖 ≤ −𝛃𝛃𝐗𝐗𝑖𝑖] 241 
= 𝐹𝐹(𝛃𝛃𝐗𝐗𝑖𝑖), 242 
where 𝐹𝐹(∙) is the cumulative distribution function of the error term 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖. We assume that 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖 243 
follows the standard normal distribution and equation (6) is estimated by probit regression. 244 
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Empirically, the straw retention adoption equation, for each household 𝑖𝑖 and cultivated plot 245 
𝑘𝑘, is assumed to be written as: 246 
 𝑃𝑃𝑟𝑟[𝑚𝑚𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 1] = 𝜃𝜃𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑛𝑛𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛃𝛃𝐗𝐗𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖, (7) 247 
where 𝑚𝑚𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 represents the adoption dummy, which equals unity if the household 𝑖𝑖 adopts 248 
straw retention on plot 𝑘𝑘; 𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑛𝑛𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 is a land tenure dummy, which equals unity if the plot is 249 
rented from others, and is designed to capture the land tenure insecurity denoted earlier as 250 
𝜆𝜆𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑛𝑛𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐; 𝐗𝐗𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 is the vector of other plot-level and household-level control variables; and, 𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 is 251 
the error term. 𝜃𝜃� is of primary interest because it measures the marginal effect of renting from 252 
others on the adoption of straw retention. 253 
The land tenure dummy may be endogenous to adoption decisions for several reasons. First, 254 
growers on rented plots may self-select into non-conservation activities. For instance, renters 255 
could be large-scale producers who are keener to maximize profits on all grounds (including 256 
rented plots) and thus are more cognizant of all possible cost savings and prone to select the 257 
profit-maximizing practice.4 Given that air quality impacts from straw burning is currently 258 
external to a producer’s decision process, the renters are more likely to adopt the least costly 259 
option as opposed to more costly straw retention. In this case, the naïve probit estimate of the 260 
rental dummy may be underestimated. In addition, there may be unobserved characteristics that 261 
                                                             
4 As indirect evidence to support the claim that renters are probably large-scale producers, we make a simple statistic for our 
surveyed sample. Of all 670 valid households, 588 households are purely own-contractees, which means they only cultivate on 
their own contracted plots throughout 2015; the remaining 82 households have rented plots to cultivate besides their 
own-contracted plots. The average area of cultivable land in 2015 for 82 renters is 16.06 Mu, about four times larger than that of 
588 purely own-contractees, which is only 4.86 Mu. 
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are correlated with both adoption choices and rental decisions, including on-farm characteristics 262 
such as land shapes, soil quality and machinery use, and off-farm factors such as 263 
government-supported agricultural policies. 264 
Technically, the endogeneity arises due to the presence of correlation between 𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑛𝑛𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 and 265 
𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖, which may bias the estimate of 𝜃𝜃�. In order to obtain a consistent 𝜃𝜃�, we further consider two 266 
approaches separately dealing with the endogeneity issue, a bivariate probit model and a control 267 
function method. 268 
4.2. Bivariate probit model 269 
The bivariate probit model is frequently used in estimating the effect of an endogenous binary 270 
treatment on a dichotomous outcome, while accounting for unobserved confounders 271 
(Wooldridge, 2010). For expositional purposes, we rewrite the adoption equation and construct 272 
the two-equation latent variable framework as follows: 273 
 𝑦𝑦∗ = 𝑚𝑚′𝛽𝛽 + 𝜃𝜃𝑎𝑎∗ + 𝑢𝑢, 𝑦𝑦 = 1 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 𝑦𝑦∗ > 0; (8) 274 
 𝑎𝑎∗ = 𝑧𝑧′𝛾𝛾 + 𝜀𝜀, 𝑎𝑎 = 1 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 𝑎𝑎∗ > 0; (9) 275 
where 𝑦𝑦∗ and 𝑎𝑎∗ represent the latent outcome (i.e., adoption) and treatment (i.e., renting) 276 
variables, respectively; 𝑚𝑚  and z  are covariates in each equation; and, 𝑢𝑢  and 𝜀𝜀  are 277 
corresponding errors. We assume that households’ rental decisions are endogenous to straw 278 
retention adoption, thus 𝜀𝜀 is correlated with 𝑢𝑢. The bivariate probit builds on the assumption 279 
that (𝑢𝑢, 𝜀𝜀)  follows a bivariate standard normal joint distribution with zero means, unit 280 
16 
 
variances, and correlation coefficient 𝜌𝜌 (i.e., 𝜌𝜌 = 𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟(𝑢𝑢, 𝜀𝜀)): 281 
 (𝑢𝑢, 𝜀𝜀)~𝑁𝑁 ��00� , �
𝜌𝜌 1
1 𝜌𝜌��. (10) 282 
To identify the parameters 𝜃𝜃 and 𝛽𝛽 in the adoption equation, the covariates 𝑧𝑧 in equation 283 
(9) must contain at least one variable as an instrument for 𝑎𝑎∗ (or exclusion restriction) not 284 
included in covariates 𝑚𝑚 in equation (8). Otherwise, simply relying on nonlinearities without 285 
excluded instruments will lead to ill specification and the estimated partial effects may also be 286 
biased (Altonji et al., 2005; Wooldridge, 2010). 287 
In particular, we construct a ratio of annual income for a family’s migrant workers to annual 288 
agricultural profits for the farmer household as the instrument for the rental variable. The higher 289 
the ratio, the higher the remittances the family receives from migration than from farming, and 290 
thus a smaller likelihood that the household would rent more farmland from other contractees. 291 
The idea is that the ratio serves as a proxy of a household’s ability to earn additional income 292 
from urban employment and thus is directly associated with household’s rental decisions. It is 293 
possible that the migrants’ income ratio is still endogenous to adoption because higher 294 
remittances means a lack of labor supply available for agricultural production, or more money to 295 
potentially buy straw retention machinery. In other words, the ratio may affect the adoption 296 
choice through laborer numbers or gross household income. Empirically, this can be overcome 297 
by including these two variables as controls.5 That way, the ratio variable is exogenous to 298 
                                                             
5 In our empirical models, as will be noted later, the number of laborers that engaged in farming activities and annual family 
income will be included as control variables in all regressions. 
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adoption conditional on available laborers and household income. 299 
4.3. Control function method 300 
The control function method addresses the endogeneity problem by directly augmenting the 301 
generalized residuals in the outcome equation, which accounts for any correlation between 𝑎𝑎∗ 302 
and 𝑢𝑢. Specifically, we can rewrite equation (8) as: 303 
 𝑦𝑦∗ = 𝑚𝑚′𝛽𝛽 + 𝜃𝜃𝑎𝑎∗ + 𝜇𝜇𝜀𝜀̃ + 𝜈𝜈, (11) 304 
where 𝜀𝜀̃ is the fitted residuals from equation (9) and identified as the inverse Mills ratio for the 305 
whole sample, which takes the form (Gourieroux et al., 1987; Vella, 1998): 306 
 𝜀𝜀̃ = 𝑎𝑎 ∗ �𝜙𝜙�𝑧𝑧
′𝛾𝛾��
Φ(𝑧𝑧′𝛾𝛾�)
� + (1 − 𝑎𝑎) ∗ � −𝜙𝜙�𝑧𝑧
′𝛾𝛾��
1−Φ(𝑧𝑧′𝛾𝛾�)
� (12) 307 
where 𝑎𝑎  is the rental dummy; 𝛾𝛾�  denotes the estimated parameter vector for the probit 308 
estimation of equation (9); and, 𝜙𝜙(∙) and Φ(∙) are normal density and normal distribution 309 
functions. 310 
Following Vella (1998), a consistent estimate of 𝜃𝜃�  can be obtained from regressing 311 
equation (11) by linear probability model (LPM), assuming the generalized residuals, 𝜀𝜀̃, has 312 
fully removed any correlation between 𝑎𝑎∗ and the new error 𝜈𝜈.6 Although technically one 313 
could rely on the nonlinearity of the probit model in the first stage of the control function 314 
approach, Wooldridge has forcefully argued that it is better to have more independent variation 315 
in the generalized residuals with inclusion of instrumental variables (Wooldridge, 2010, p.599). 316 
                                                             
6 For detailed discussions about why equation (11) is required being estimated by LPM and characteristics of the generalized 
residuals, see Vella (1998). 
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As a result, we rely on the migrants’ income ratio in the first stage of the control function 317 
approach when generating the generalized residuals. It is important to note that the control 318 
function method with binary endogenous explanatory variables in nonlinear models is more 319 
controversial, because it requires nonstandard assumptions including that the generalized 320 
residuals act as a kind of sufficient statistic for capturing the endogeneity of the land tenure 321 
variable (Wooldridge, 2015). However, these assumptions are no more or less general than the 322 
bivariate probit assumptions (Wooldridge, 2015). In addition, equation (11) itself can serve as an 323 
endogeneity test of the binary treatment variable, the rental dummy in our model, and as an 324 
analogue of the Rivers-Vuong approach, which deals with a continuous endogenous variable in a 325 
binary response model (Rivers and Vuong, 1988).7 Specifically, rejection of the null hypothesis 326 
that 𝜇𝜇 = 0 in equation (11) implies that 𝑎𝑎 is endogenous. 327 
Empirically, we provide the estimation results of the two approaches—a bivariate probit and 328 
a control function method—to quantify the marginal effect of rental decision on straw retention 329 
adoption after controlling for the endogeneity of the land tenure variable. 330 
5. Data Description 331 
The data used in this study is drawn from a rural household survey conducted by Henan 332 
Agricultural University in 2016 in Henan Province, a major grain production province in central 333 
                                                             
7 In Rivers-Vuong’s two-step approach, first run an OLS of the endogenous continuous variable, say 𝑦𝑦2, on covariates z2 and 
obtain the residuals 𝑣𝑣�; then run the probit of the binary outcome variable, say 𝑦𝑦1, on covariates z1, 𝑦𝑦2 and 𝑣𝑣�. While in our 
model, the first-stage regression is probit and the second-stage is OLS but with generalized residuals. 
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China. Henan is also a big crop straw producer, accompanied by severe air pollution resulting 334 
from straw burning in open fields (Fu et al., 2017). 335 
We have followed a stratified sampling approach in collecting our sample: for each of the 336 
17 prefecture cities in Henan province, we randomly selected two to four counties, and within 337 
each county, we randomly selected one or two villages among the agriculturally significant 338 
counties based on historical planting area. About 50 trained undergraduate research assistants 339 
went to these sampled villages for face-to-face interviews of farmers. With the help of local 340 
village and county officials, we randomly selected 10 percent of rural households within each 341 
village based on the household registry roster. In total, our sample consists of 670 valid rural 342 
household responses spanning across 175 villages in 47 counties (see Figure 2). 343 
The household-level data covers detailed information about agricultural production and 344 
operation throughout 2015, as well as household and personal characteristics (see Appendix 1 for 345 
the full version of the questionnaire). We also supplement the survey data with climatic 346 
information obtained from the National Meteorological Information Center (NMIC), which 347 
reports county-level historical averages for climate variables from 1981 to 2000 in Henan 348 
Province.8  349 
In our study area, many farmers grow at least two crops every year, typically corn during 350 
the autumn season (from June to October) and winter wheat during the winter season (from 351 
October to June). As a result, farmers face two annual straw retention choices. To better identify 352 
                                                             
8 As mentioned earlier, since Henan province is not included in the pilot project for a straw retention subsidy, in our study area 
for the 2015 crop year, there is no subsidy available for farmers specifically targeted to incentivize straw retention. 
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the impact of tenure, we treat straw retention choices for these crops separately and our unit of 353 
observation is at the plot-level for each season, with each representing a particular crop for a 354 
particular growing season. 355 
 356 
 357 
Figure 2. Map of Henan Province in China, the sampled region. 358 
 359 
For each specified plot, the farmer is asked how he or she dealt with the straws after harvest 360 
and asked to choose among the following options: straw retention, burn, use for fuel, use for 361 
Henan 
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feed, sell, and discard. We assume that straw retention is adopted for a particular plot if straw 362 
retention is chosen, no matter whether there are other selected options as well and regardless of 363 
the specific share of straws being returned to the field (retention).9 Of all observations, 9.3 364 
percent of plots are rented and 90.7 percent are own-contracted, but the areas of rented plots 365 
account for 20.3 percent of total cultivated land areas in our sample. In addition, 70.8 percent of 366 
plots adopted straw retention, 44.1 percent are wheat plots, 38.4 percent are corn plots, and 17.5 367 
percent are other crops including rice, soybean, peanuts, cotton, etc. 368 
All plots are classified by a binary land tenure variable: own-contracted versus rented from 369 
others. Own-contracted refers to plots with current growers that are the original contractees of 370 
land allocated directly from the village collectives and who hold both the land contract and use 371 
rights. Rented plots are those which current growers rented from original contractees and thus 372 
only hold the land use rights. After eliminating (a) all plots that are not cultivated in 2015; and,  373 
(b) plots where the planted crops do not generate straws, and thus do not involve any treatment 374 
of straw, we have 1,659 plot-level observations from 670 farmer households for analysis.10 375 
As mentioned above, we form our instrument by constructing a ratio of annual income for 376 
family’s migrant workers to annual agricultural profits for the farmer household. 11 More 377 
                                                             
9 The survey does not collect information about the shares of straws for different straw treatments. 
10 Due to widely used informal contracts between farmer households in most cases, it is not clear how the decision is made on a 
rented plot in this context. The decision-making process has been shown crucial in affecting adoption of conservation practices 
(Soule et al., 2000; Kurkalova et al., 2006). For instance, in the United States, there are two types of land renter: share-renters’ 
decisions may be affected by land owners because both the owners and renters share the revenues and costs of production; 
cash-renters, however, may behave more independently since they only pay a fixed rent to the landlords while the owners do not 
participate in any activities. Failure to consider the differences in decision-making process may obscure the effect of land tenure 
on adoption. 
11 Besides migrant income and agricultural profits, the annual household income also includes income from off-farm business or 
employment, transfer income such as pensions and government subsidies, etc. Statistics from our survey reveals that migrants’ 
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specifically, the annual migrant income is calculated by the number of family migrant members 378 
working outside the village, times the average working months, times the average monthly 379 
wages. The annual agricultural profits are simply the profits of planting crops for the whole 380 
family. All this information has been collected through the survey. 381 
We follow the extant literature of soil conservation practices in selecting other control 382 
variables of farmer and field characteristics (Feder et al., 1988; Fox et al., 1991; Knowler and 383 
Bradshaw, 2007; Baumgart-Gets et al., 2012; Zhang et al. 2016). Table 1 shows the descriptions 384 
of selected variables. First, we include three farmer characteristics of the household head (who is 385 
also the main operator): age, years of farming, and risk preference.12 Farmers with more 386 
experience and more risk-taking attitudes are expected to have a higher likelihood of adopting 387 
conservation practices. A second set of variables control for household-level characteristics, 388 
which include highest years of education of all household members, number of laborers, family 389 
income, participation in agricultural economic organization, and purchase of agricultural 390 
insurance. We hypothesize that a richer, well-connected farmer household with better education, 391 
more laborers, and insurance coverage is more likely to adopt straw retention. In addition, July 392 
temperature and July precipitation are two weather variables included as controls of local climate 393 
effect on farmer’s adoption choice. Finally, at the plot level, we consider plot size, a season 394 
dummy, and crop dummies to control for possible scale and seasonal effects, and heterogeneous 395 
                                                                                                                                                                                                    
income and agricultural profits jointly account for about 75 percent of gross household income on average. 
12 The household head’s attitude towards risk is measured through response to a binary question “whether you will utilize a 
newly developed fertilizer that may increase yields but has not been used yet” and is assigned “risk-seeking” if answering “yes” 
and “risk averse” otherwise. 
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impacts of crop types. We do not consider other topographic features, such as plot slope, because 396 
most of our study area is flat and thus we do not expect significant within-province variation. 397 
 398 
Table 1. Descriptions of Selected Variables 399 
Variable Description 
Straw retention Straw retention is adopted in the plot (1=yes, 0=no) 
Rented plot The plot is rented from other contractees (1=yes, 0=no) 
Age Age of the household head 
Farming experience Number of farming years of the household head 
Risk preference Risk preference of the household head (1=risk seeking, 0=risk averseness) 
Education Highest years of education of all household members 
Number of laborers Number of laborers that engaged in farming activities in 2015 
Income Household annual income in 2015 (10,000 Yuan) 
Organization The household has participated in rural economic organization (1=yes, 0=no) 
Insurance The household has purchased agricultural insurance (1=yes, 0=no) 
Plot size Plot area (mu=0.0667 hectares) 
Mig-ag ratio 
Ratio of annual income for family’s migrant workers to annual agricultural profits for 
the farmer household in 2015 
July temperature 
Average daily temperature of July days from 1981 to 2000 of the county that the 
household locates (℃) 
July precipitation Average annual daily precipitation of July days from 1981 to 2000 (mm) 
Winter season The plot is cultivated in the winter season (1=winter season, 0=autumn season) 
Wheat The plot is planted wheat (1=yes, 0=no) 
Corn The plot is planted corn (1=yes, 0=no) 
Other crop The plot is planted other crops (1=yes, 0=no) 
 400 
Table 2 shows summary statistics for the selected variables used in our model by tenure 401 
type. The last column reports the sample t-test results of mean differences (rented minus 402 
own-contracted) of each of the variables. Basically, the raw descriptive adoption rate for straw 403 
retention on rented plots is about five percent lower, though insignificantly, compared to 404 
24 
 
own-contracted plots, confirming our general expectation. It is worthwhile to note that the 405 
instrumental variable—the migrants’ income ratio on rented plots—is significantly less than that 406 
on own-contracted plots, which is in line with our assumption that higher remittances from 407 
migration decrease the probability of renting. Another notable fact is that rented plots are 408 
generally (3.56 mu) larger in size, which provides partial evidence that renters are probably 409 
large-scale producers. Other factors with significant differences include age, education, 410 
household income, etc. 411 
 412 
Table 2. Summary Statistics of Selected Variables by Tenure Type 413 
Variable 
All plots Own contracted plots Rented plots T-test of 
mean diff Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. 
Straw retention 0.708  0.45  0.712  0.45  0.665  0.47  -0.048  
Rented plot 0.093  0.29  - - - - - 
Age 44.28  11.76  44.08  11.93  46.28  9.71  2.20** 
Farming experience 28.28  13.59  28.32  13.55  27.92  14.04  -0.40  
Risk preference 0.679  0.47  0.676  0.47  0.710  0.46  0.034  
Education 12.40  3.58  12.32  3.59  13.20  3.47  0.88*** 
Number of laborers 2.611  1.26  2.620  1.27  2.516  1.21  -0.104  
Income 4.201  3.15  4.087  2.96  5.351 4.48  1.26*** 
Organization 0.041  0.20  0.041  0.20  0.039  0.19  -0.003  
Insurance 0.129  0.34  0.116  0.32  0.258  0.44  0.14*** 
Plot size 4.135  4.25  3.802  2.61  7.363  10.80  3.56*** 
Mig-ag ratio 6.703 11.54 6.896 11.83 4.829 8.02 -2.07** 
July temperature 26.98  0.36  26.97  0.36  27.05  0.34  0.08*** 
July precipitation 337.6  70.4  336.5  67.7  348.2  92.0  -11.74** 
Winter season 0.461  0.50  0.463  0.50  0.439  0.50  -0.024  
Wheat 0.441  0.50  0.443  0.50  0.413  0.49  -0.031  
Corn 0.384  0.49  0.387  0.49  0.355  0.48  -0.032  
Other crop 0.175  0.38  0.170  0.38  0.232  0.42  0.06* 
Observations 1659 1504 155 
 
Note: ***, **, and * represent significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
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6. Empirical Results 414 
6.1. Base probit regressions with an endogenous regressor 415 
We first report the results of several simple probit regressions in which we test whether the 416 
probability of adopting straw retention is higher in own-contracted plots than rented plots. That 417 
is, we test the null hypothesis that 𝛽𝛽 = 0, where 𝛽𝛽 = 𝜆𝜆𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑛𝑛𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐 − 𝜆𝜆𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑛𝑛𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐 is the coefficient on 418 
the tenure dummy and represents the difference of tenure-security indicator between 419 
own-contracted and rented plots. Table 3 presents the resulting estimated average partial effects. 420 
 421 
 422 
 423 
 424 
 425 
 426 
 427 
 428 
 429 
 430 
 431 
 432 
 433 
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Table 3. Results of the Binary Probit Regressions (Dependent: Adoption=1) 434 
Variable 
(1) Full sample (2) Own contracted (3) Rented 
Marg. eff. Marg. eff. Marg. eff. 
Rented plot -0.0819** 
  
Age -0.0021 -0.0036* 0.0068 
Farming experience 0.0002 0.0013 -0.0035 
Risk preference 0.0349 0.024 0.0903 
Education 0.0166*** 0.0147*** 0.0274** 
Number of laborers 0.0659*** 0.0635*** 0.1041*** 
Income 0.0054 0.0056 -0.0013 
Organization 0.1853** 0.1986** 0.1909 
Insurance 0.1239*** 0.1380*** 0.0842 
Plot size 0.0093** 0.0122** 0.0027 
July temperature -0.0792* -0.1153 0.1766 
July precipitation 0.0013*** 0.0013*** 0.0011** 
Winter season 0.1284** 0.1600** 0.0176 
    Crop dummies Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 1659 1659 1659 
% correctly predicted 0.8005 0.8005 0.8005 
LR test (p-value) χ2(14)=30.06 (0.0075) 
Note: ***, **, and * represent significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. Standard errors are 
clustered at the household level. The marg. eff. columns report the average partial effects across 
all individuals in the sample. The null of the likelihood ratio test is no systematic difference in 
coefficients across tenure types. 
 435 
Column (1) in Table 3 displays the results using the full sample. The marginal effect of the 436 
“rented plot” dummy is negative and significant at the five percent level, and shows that a rented 437 
plot is associated with about eight percent lower probability of adopting straw retention than an 438 
own-contracted plot, ceteris paribus. The result confirms our hypothesis and is consistent with 439 
previous studies regarding the impacts of land tenure on conservation practice adoption (Soule et 440 
al., 2000; Fraser, 2004; Kabubo-Mariara et al., 2010). The household-level characteristics appear 441 
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to be more important in the adoption decision—higher educational attainment, greater number of 442 
laborers, participation in an agricultural economic organization, and purchase of agricultural 443 
insurance are significantly and positively related to increased likelihood of adoption. More 444 
specifically, each extra year of education increases the probability of adoption by about two 445 
percent and one more laborer leads to an increase of the likelihood of adoption by about seven 446 
percent. Participation in agricultural economic organization and purchase of agricultural 447 
insurance have a larger effect on adoption, with values of about 19 percent and 12 percent, 448 
respectively. Two climate variables are significant, suggesting that straw retention occurs more 449 
frequently where the climate is warmer and wetter (more rain). The estimated coefficient of plot 450 
size indicates that one more unit increase of plot size results in an about one percent increase of 451 
the likelihood of adoption, which reflects that larger farmland in fact lowers the average cost of 452 
adoption. The positive and significant winter dummy verifies the existence of seasonal effect on 453 
residue management. 454 
We also examine whether the estimated coefficients systematically differ by tenure type. We 455 
conduct separate probit regressions for each of the two tenure categories, own-contracted and 456 
rented plots, with all other independent variables the same as those in the full-sample regression. 457 
A Chi-square statistic of 30.06 in the likelihood ratio test rejects the null hypothesis that the 458 
coefficients are identical across tenure types, implying that the impact of all other characteristics 459 
on adoption of straw retention relies on the specific tenure status of the plot.13 The resulting 460 
                                                             
13 In conducting the likelihood ratio test, we do not specify clustered standard errors at any level in the regressions. 
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coefficients and average partial effects by tenure type are reported in columns (2) and (3) in 461 
Table 3, which shows that despite similarity in other variables, the age of household head, 462 
organization participation, purchase of insurance, plot size, and seasonal effect only matter for 463 
own-contracted plots, while they have no effect on adoption for rented plots. The sharp disparity 464 
reflects a significantly different decision mechanism for a renter in adopting straw retention. 465 
Although the simple probit models shown in Table 3 provide suggestive evidence of the negative 466 
impacts of land rental decisions on straw retention adoptions, it is important to note that the key 467 
variable of interest, the land rental variable, is potentially endogenous and thus the estimates 468 
might be biased. 469 
6.2. Results of bivariate probit model and control function method 470 
To control for or mitigate the endogeneity of the rental variable, we also employ two alternative 471 
approaches—a bivariate probit and a control function method with a linear probability model. In 472 
both models, the ratio of migrants’ income to agricultural profits for the farmer household is used 473 
as the instrument.14 Results are reported in Tables 4 and 5, respectively. 474 
 475 
 476 
 477 
 478 
 479 
                                                             
14 We have also tried “migrants’ income in levels” and “relative share of migrants’ income” as exclusion restrictions. Results are 
very similar, but using the ratio variable as the restriction has the best fits. Regression results for bivariate probit and control 
function method using the other two restrictions are available from authors upon request. 
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Table 4. Results of Bivariate Probit Model 480 
Variable 
Adoption Equation Renting Equation 
Marg. eff. p-value Coef. p-value 
Rented plot -0.5113*** 0.000 
  
Age -0.0008 0.547 0.0187*** 0.004 
Farming experience -0.0006 0.603 -0.0107** 0.034 
Risk preference 0.0353* 0.070 -0.0377 0.699 
Education 0.0165*** 0.000 0.0276** 0.037 
Number of laborers 0.0585*** 0.000 -0.0597 0.119 
Income 0.0064** 0.043 0.0301** 0.021 
Organization 0.1650*** 0.001 0.0321 0.888 
Insurance 0.1425*** 0.000 0.5818*** 0.000 
Plot size 0.0149*** 0.000 0.0804*** 0.000 
July temperature -0.0610* 0.064 
  
July precipitation 0.0011*** 0.000 
  
Winter season 0.1058* 0.071 
  
Mig-ag ratio 
  
-0.0110** 0.042 
     ρ (p-value) 0.7100** (0.0108) 
Crop dummies Yes No 
Observations 1659 
Note: ***, **, and * represent significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. Standard errors 
are clustered at the household level. The marg. eff. column reports the average partial effects 
across all individuals in the sample. 
 481 
As seen in the bivariate probit model, the rental dummy is still negatively significant at the 482 
one percent level, but with a much higher average partial effect of 0.5113, meaning that being on 483 
a rented plot would lower the probability of adoption of straw retention by half. The signs and 484 
significance of most of other explanatory variables remain nearly unchanged when compared 485 
with the base model, except that household head’s risk preference and household income become 486 
significant in the bivariate probit model. 487 
 488 
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Table 5. Results of Control Function with LPM15 489 
Variable 
LPM Probit 
Coef. (Marg. eff.) p-value Coef. p-value 
Rented plot -0.5251* 0.054  
  
Age -0.0004 0.863  0.0218*** 0.005  
Farming experience -0.0012 0.512  -0.0122* 0.081  
Risk preference 0.0386 0.241  0.0188 0.893  
Education 0.0210*** 0.000  0.0310* 0.091  
Number of laborers 0.0607*** 0.000  -0.0508 0.400  
Income 0.0082 0.170  0.0274 0.152  
Organization 0.1427** 0.043  -0.0117 0.974  
Insurance 0.1718*** 0.000  0.5829*** 0.000  
Plot size 0.0137*** 0.003  0.0772*** 0.000  
July temperature -0.0821 0.121  
  
July precipitation 0.0015*** 0.000  
  
Winter season 0.1696** 0.030  
  
Generalized residual 0.2293 0.109  
  
Mig-ag ratio 
  
-0.0048 0.517  
Intercept 1.9038 0.165  -2.7877*** 0.000  
     Crop dummies Yes No 
Observations 1659 
Note: ***, **, and * represent significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. Standard 
errors are clustered at the household level. 
 490 
As for the control function method, the marginal effect of the rental dummy is -0.5251 and 491 
significant at the ten percent level. It is noteworthy that the generalized residual term appears 492 
insignificant at any significance level but with a very close p-value of 0.109, which fails to reject 493 
the null hypothesis that renting is exogenous, suggesting that at least the endogeneity may not be 494 
that apparent in our case. However, it is important to note that one could not fully rely on a 495 
                                                             
15 In an identical model but without exclusion restriction variable (i.e. “mig-ag ratio” is excluded in the probit regression), whose 
identification of the endogenous rental variable simply relies on the nonlinearity nature of the generalized residual, the coefficient 
(marginal effect) of the rental dummy is -0.3707 but insignificant with a p-value of 0.16. 
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marginally insignificant test statistic to claim full exogeneity.16 We argue that our control 496 
function approach at least mitigated, if not fully addressed, the endogeneity concerns. We also 497 
want to caution readers that alternative specifications of our control function approach, using 498 
alternative set of instruments such as migrants’ income in levels or without any instrumental 499 
variables in the first stage, lead to statistically insignificant coefficient for the land tenure 500 
variable. This suggests further research is needed to examine the robustness of these results but 501 
even in these alternative specifications the coefficient for land tenure on straw retention is still 502 
negative. 503 
Contrary to the results in the adoption regression, characteristics of the household head, 504 
including age and farming experience, appear to play an important role in driving land rental 505 
decisions. Higher family education level, higher family income, and purchase of insurance are 506 
positively related to the probability of renting more farmland. In addition, the positive and 507 
significant coefficient of plot size confirms our conjecture that renters are more likely to rent 508 
larger fields or more farmland. The exclusion restriction variable (migrants’ income ratio) is 509 
negatively significant in the bivariate probit model, which confirms our expectation that 510 
households with higher remittances from migrant members are less willing to rent from other 511 
contractees. This variable has negative coefficient in the control function approach as well but it 512 
is statistically insignificant. 513 
6.3. Discussion 514 
                                                             
16 We thank an anonymous reviewer for pointing this out. 
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Our empirical results provide evidence that land tenure insecurity, as proxied by rented plots, 515 
tend to negatively impact farmers’ decisions to adopt straw retention in China. Combining results 516 
of all three regression models, we discover that after dealing with the potential endogeneity 517 
issue, there is a dramatic increase in magnitude of the average marginal effect of renting on 518 
conservation practice adoption, from about -0.08 in the base model to around -0.50, which is 519 
much higher than that in the existing literature (Soule et al., 2000; Gebremedhin and Swinton, 520 
2003; Kabubo-Mariara et al., 2010; Baumgart-Gets et al., 2012). This increase is intuitive in the 521 
sense that the base probit model may be underestimated, either due to renters’ self-selection 522 
behaviors or omission of some important covariates. More specifically in our data analysis, the 523 
omitted unobservables could be positively related to both farmers’ rental decisions and adoption 524 
choices. Evidence includes the positive coefficient on the residual term (although insignificant) 525 
from the second-stage regressions in two control function models and the positive and significant 526 
𝜌𝜌 in the bivariate probit that measures correlation between adoption and renting equations. 527 
Availability of machinery and agricultural subsidies from local government may be two 528 
omitted factors and unfortunately they were not covered in our survey data.17 Use of machinery 529 
can facilitate straw retention and save laborers to a large extent, so households who own relevant 530 
machines, or are able to rent machines from outside supplies, are more likely to adopt straw 531 
retention. Meanwhile, machinery availability may further lead to an increased likelihood of 532 
                                                             
17 We thank an anonymous review for pointing out that these two factors may be correlated, though slightly, with the instrument 
variable, the migrants’ income ratio. We acknowledge that the constructed ratio variable may not fully solve the endogeneity of 
the rental dummy. While in this sense, the use of control function method could mitigate the endogeneity problem to a large 
extent. 
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renting more farmland to gain economies of scale and enhance productivity. China’s central 533 
government has granted rural farmers four categories of agricultural subsidies for many years to 534 
boost grain production.18 Although these subsidies do not directly target conservation, it is 535 
reasonable to infer that households receiving more subsidies are less vulnerable to uncertain 536 
short-term profit loss from adopting straw retention. Moreover, households residing in areas 537 
where the subsidies are available are more willing to grow crops and thus more likely to rent 538 
more farmland simply to increase income. Recent studies in China also support the claim that 539 
machinery use and subsidies play an important and positive role in inducing straw retention 540 
behaviors, and their effects warrant further research.19 541 
Furthermore, the descriptive data from our sample seems to suggest that current land rental 542 
arrangements may be significantly insecure. Of all 82 surveyed households (out of a total of 690) 543 
who rent land from others, 75 households (about 95 percent) are based on oral land leases 544 
without legal validity; only four households (about five percent) have signed formal and written 545 
contracts, and 65 households’ leases (about 82 percent) are on a one-year-tenure basis. The 546 
figures reflect that the tenure of a rented plot, or the transferred land use right, may be far less 547 
secure than land contract rights in Henan province.20 548 
                                                             
18 Four categories of subsidies include direct grain subsidy, superior grain varieties subsidy, agricultural machinery and tools 
subsidy, and general agricultural suppliers subsidy. Unlike the straw retention subsidy that is about to take effect in recent years, 
these subsidies have been available since 2004 in most areas of China. 
19 See Qi et al. (2016) and Tong and Liu (2017) as examples. 
20 To test the potential effects of contract type and lease term on adoption, we have also run several probit regressions for only 
the 155 renters in our sample. Results are reported in Table A.1 in Appendix 2, where we list four specifications with column (1) 
the base model and columns (2)–(4) with one or two of the contract variables augmented. However, results reveal that neither of 
the two contract variables is significant in any specification. Therefore, we are unable to identify the effect of contract type and 
renewal frequency in this study. 
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7. Concluding Remarks 549 
Based on data from a 2016 farmer household survey in Henan Province in central China, we 550 
apply several probit regressions, including a bivariate probit model and a control function 551 
method, to examine how land tenure arrangements especially land rental decisions affect the 552 
probability of adopting crop straw retention. We employ an instrument that relies on the 553 
remittance income from household members who migrate to cities to address the potential 554 
endogeneity of the land tenure variable. Empirical results show that farmer households are more 555 
likely to adopt straw retention after harvest on own-contracted than rented plots, which is 556 
consistent with previous literature that shows insecure land tenure often hinders adoption of 557 
conservation practices. This study provides some of the first evidence in assessing the negative 558 
impact of land tenure insecurity on the adoption of a long-term land improvement practice, straw 559 
retention. 560 
Our findings have important and valuable policy implications. The Chinese government is 561 
currently encouraging participation of market-based rural land transfer as an alternative to 562 
committee-intervening land reallocation to improve agricultural production efficiency. However, 563 
our results imply that more careful deliberation or monitoring is warranted regarding the 564 
potential impediments to less-sustainable farming practices on the growing acres of rented 565 
grounds. Our results also suggest that the air quality and other environmental benefits from 566 
encouraged straw retention could be impacted without further efforts to boost adoption on rented 567 
land. Due to less secure land tenure, farmers on rented plots may have lower incentives to adopt 568 
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conservation practices, causing environmental problems such as more PM 2.5 emissions from 569 
straw burning and more severe soil degradation. Improving the land tenure security, especially 570 
for rented plots, may be one effective measure. For instance, the government could regulate the 571 
rental market by enforcing the use of a more stable and formal written contract, which 572 
incorporates specific requirements on conservation practices and residue management. On the 573 
other hand, it may also be helpful to extend the current range of land contract rights transfer from 574 
within-village to cross-village or within-township, in order to allow farmer households to own 575 
more contracted land and stimulate long-run land improvements. 576 
The importance of our findings notwithstanding, they are limited by the fact that some of 577 
important factors such as availability of machinery and agricultural subsidies were not covered in 578 
our survey. Moreover, the effects of different aspects of tenure security need further 579 
investigation. For instance, the duration of tenure, another important dimension of tenure 580 
security either for own-contracted or rented land, may also play a role in affecting the adoption 581 
rate. In addition, with a panel dataset, one can examine whether the adoption rate of straw 582 
retention varies over time under different policy scenarios, such as varying strictness on 583 
restricting the burning of straws and the forthcoming straw retention subsidy. It is possible that 584 
the higher adoption rate is mainly due to the prohibition of straw burning. 585 
Another caveat is that our empirical results may not always be robust in terms of the 586 
significance and magnitude of the land rental variable when we rely on alternative instruments in 587 
both the biprobit and control function models. For instance, using migrant income in levels or 588 
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relative share of migrants’ income could lead to differing estimated marginal effects of rental 589 
ranging from 38 percent to 51 percent. However, it is important to note that the rental variable 590 
has been shown consistently to negatively impact the adoption of straw retention, even in cases 591 
of statistical insignificance. This could result from our data limitation of only relying on one 592 
year’s data, or lack of information about some important omitted factors, which suggests 593 
additional research to examine the role of land tenure in conservation practice adoptions. 594 
 595 
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Appendix 1: Translated Version of Survey Questionnaire 748 
Survey on Farmers' Planting Behavior in Henan Province 2015 749 
City County Town Village   Date  750 
Name of interviewee Contact number  Name of interviewer  751 
 752 
A. On-farm Operation of Tillage and Straw Return in 2015 753 
A1 In 2015, total areas of family cultivable land is           Mu; # of plots           ; the 754 
area of the biggest plot is           Mu. 755 
A2 Land area for 
each property 
type (Mu) 
Own-contracted         Rented-in         Trusteeship   
Plot Index X1 X2 X3 X4 Y1 Y2 Y3 Y4 Z1 Z2 
A3 Plot area (Mu)           
A4 Contract type NA NA NA NA     NA NA 
A5 Lease term (ys) NA NA NA NA     NA NA 
Season 1: Autumn 
A6a Crop           
A7a Straw treatment           
A8a Reasons for SR 
adoption 
          
A9a Reasons for SR 
non-adoption 
          
Season 2: Winter-Summer 
A6b Crop           
A7b Straw treatment           
A8b Reasons for SR 
adoption 
          
A9b Reasons for SR 
non-adoption 
          
Note:  756 
1. Plot division: Plots with the same property type and identical planted crops for both seasons is treated as 757 
ONE plot (no matter whether the plot(s) is(are) connected). 758 
2. A4 Contract type: 1=oral; 2=written. 759 
3. A6 Crop: 0=not planted; 1=wheat; 2=corn; 3=rice; 4=soybean; 5=peanut; 6=cotton; 7=inter-panting; 760 
8=others. 761 
4. A7 Straw treatment (multiple choices):1=straw return (SR); 2=burn; 3=use as feed; 4=use as fuel; 5=for 762 
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sale; 6=discard; 7=no straw；8=others. 763 
5. A8 Reasons for SR adoption (multiple choices): 1=soil improvement; 2=fertilizer saving; 3=policy 764 
factors; 4= increasing production/income; 5=unable to handle; 6=environmental protection; 7=others. 765 
6. A9 Reasons for SR non-adoption (multiple choices): 1=affecting planting; 2=cost saving; 3=policy 766 
factors; 4=lack of laborers; 5=lack of machinery; 6=feeling troublesome; 7= avoiding infected by pests 767 
and diseases; 8=others. 768 
 769 
B. Production and Operation of Crop Planting in 2015 770 
B01 Purpose of farming（     ） 771 
1=to increase income; 2=to hold land property; 3=to eat；4=without other job opportunities if not 772 
farming; 5=scale management; 6=others. 773 
B02 What do you think is the most currently necessary technology for farming（     ） 774 
1=new varieties; 2=new fertilizers; 3=new pesticides; 4=new machinery; 5=new irrigation facilities; 775 
6=others. 776 
B03 What do you think is the harm of excessive use of chemical fertilizer and pesticide777 
（     ） 778 
1=causing residues harmful to human; 2=soil compaction; 3=waste of resources; 4=pollution；5=have 779 
to gradually increase the input of chemical fertilizer and pesticide; 6=reducing soil fertility; 7=no 780 
harm; 8=others. 781 
 782 
Crop index W1 Wheat 
W2 
Corn 
W3 
Rice 
W4 
Soybean 
W5 
Other (  ) 
B1 Sown area (Mu)      
B2 Yield (kg/Mu)      
B3 Sale price (￥/kg)      
B4 Seed price (￥/Mu)      
B5a Base fertilizer cost (￥/Mu)      
B5b Top-dressing cost (￥/Mu)      
B6 Pesticide cost (￥/Mu)      
B7 Irritation cost (￥/Mu)      
B8 Machinery cost (￥/Mu)      
B9 Labor cost (￥/Mu)      
B10 Other cost (￥/Mu)      
Note: 783 
1. In this table, only record crops that involve straw treatment; for those without straws (e.g. watermelon, 784 
pepper, vegetables, etc.), no need to fill in.  785 
2. B9 Labor cost: If the household hires workers at any part of the cost link (B5 – B8), count the cost as labor 786 
cost and fill it in B9, and leave the corresponding blank (B5 – B8) empty. 787 
46 
 
C. Characteristics of Farmer Household and Members 788 
R
is
k 
Aw
ar
en
es
s 
D1 Have you bought fake fertilizers, fake seeds or fake pesticides（     ） 0=No; 1=Yes 
D2 Do you care about new agricultural techniques or products（     ） 0=No; 1=Yes 
D3 If there is a newly developed pesticide or fertilizer, but no one has ever used it. Will 
you be willing to try it（     ） 
1=Absolutely not; 2=Try in some fields; 3=Use it in all fields 
D4 Do you get relevant information of straw return through the following 
media? 
0=No; 1=Yes 
a. neighbor/villager（     ） 
b. relatives/friends（     ） 
c. village committee（     ） 
d. experts in agriculture（     ） 
e. radio/television media（     ） 
f. internet（     ） 
g. other（please note                    ） 
H
ou
se
ho
ld
 In
fo
rm
at
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n 
D5 Total # of family members           
D6 Total # of family laborers           
D7 # of family migrant members working outside the village in 2015           
D8 Average # of working (outside) months in 2015           
D9 Average wages for migrant members in 2015          ￥/month 
D10 Total income of migrant members in 2015                
D11 Does your family have a village cadre（     ） 0=No; 1=Yes 
D12 Does your family have a party member（     ） 0=No; 1=Yes 
D13 Whether a basic-living-allowance family（     ） 0=No; 1=Yes 
D14 Does your family participate in agricultural economic organization（ ） 0=No; 1=Yes 
D15 Does your family purchase agricultural insurance（     ） 0=No; 1=Yes 
D16 Does your family participate in land trusteeship（     ） 0=No; 1=Yes 
D17 Is there a family member who participated in technical training（    ） 0=No; 1=Yes 
D18 # of households with which your family often contact          
D19 Are there any relatives who have settled down or worked in city（   ） 0=No; 1=Yes 
D20 In 2015, the annual household income was               ￥, among which the 
crop profit was               ￥ 
H
ou
se
ho
ld
 H
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d 
In
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D21 Gender（     ） 0=Female; 1=Male 
D22 Age          
D23 Health condition（     ） 1=Great; 2=good; 3=medium; 4=bad; 5=disabled 
D24 Years of education          
D25 The highest # of years of education of all your family members is          
D26 Farming experience         years 
  789 
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Appendix 2: Additional Regression Results 790 
Table A.1  Probit Regression Results for Renters Only (Dependent: adoption=1) 791 
Variable (1) Base (2) (3) (4) 
Age 0.0297  0.0289  0.0280  0.0276  
Farming experience -0.0155  -0.0150  -0.0126  -0.0124  
Risk preference 0.3962  0.4074  0.4172  0.4215  
Education 0.1200** 0.1215** 0.1156** 0.1165** 
Number of laborers 0.4566*** 0.4500*** 0.4702*** 0.4654*** 
Income -0.0058  -0.0039  -0.0294  -0.0269  
Organization 0.8375  0.8453  0.8886  0.8883  
Insurance 0.3692  0.3212  0.3770  0.3508  
Plot size 0.0118  0.0093  0.0071  0.0054  
July temperature 0.7747  0.7950  0.7542  0.7644  
July precipitation 0.0049** 0.0050** 0.0044** 0.0045** 
Winter season 0.0772  0.0609  0.0886  0.0784  
Contract type 
 
0.3711  
 
0.2126  
Term of lease 
  
0.1109  0.1058  
Intercept -25.6801** -26.2282** -24.9656* -25.2419** 
     Crop dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 155 155 155 155 
Note: ***, **, and * represent significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. Standard 
errors are clustered at the household level. “Contract type” is a dummy equal to unity if 
the lease is written (oral otherwise). “Term of lease” is a variable indicating how many 
years the lease covers. 
 792 
